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ABSTRACT
This research examines whether structural parameters of new keynesian models are stable in Malaysia. We imposed the 
structural restrictions as in DSGE models suggested by Smets and Wouters (2003) and Wickens (2011). We then estimated 
whether the 2007 financial crisis changes structural parameters by using structural VAR estimation. Our parameters 
estimates are significant and correctly signed. This empirical finding has found that the structural parameters are not 
stable after the 2007 financial crisis, for employment, rate of return on loans and policy rate. However, the effects are 
little on the real variables such as output, investment, consumption and price level. In addition, unexpected change of 
demand in the non-bank private sector has puzzled the rate of return on loans after the economic crisis compared with 
before the economic crisis. The monetary policy shocks have given a fluctuation effect on the rate of return on loans 
and employment after the economic crisis. 
Keywords: Global financial crisis, structural parameters
ABSTRAK
Kajian ini menganalisis sama ada struktur parameter model keynesian adalah stabil di Malaysia. Kajian ini menggunakan 
kekangan berstruktur seperti model DSGE oleh Smets dan Wouters (2003) dan Wickens (2011). Seterusnya, kajian ini 
menganggarkan sama ada krisis kewangan 2007 mengubah struktur parameter dengan menggunakan penganggaran 
VAR berstruktur (SVAR). Penganggaran parameter adalah signifikan dan menunjukkan hubungan yang benar. Penemuan 
kajian mendapati bahawa struktur parameter iaitu gunatenaga, kadar pulangan terhadap pinjaman dan kadar bunga 
dasar adalah tidak stabil selepas krisis kewangan 2007. Namun. kesannya adalah rendah terhadap pemboleh ubah 
benar seperti output, pelaburan, penggunaan, dan tingkat harga. Tambahan lagi, perubahan permintaan yang tidak 
dijangkakan dalam sektor swasta bukan bank memberi kesan yang tidak pasti terhadap kadar pulangan pinjaman 
selepas krisis berbanding sebelum krisis ekonomi. Kejutan dasar monetari memberi kesan turun naik terhadap kadar 
pulangan pinjaman dan guna tenaga selepas krisis ekonomi. 
Kata kunci : Krisis kewangan global ; struktur parameter
INTRODUCTION
A new Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium 
model (DSGE) has been widely used by many developed 
countries in applied macroeconomics. The model 
includes sticky prices, habit formation, capital adjustment 
costs, variable capacity utilization and other frictions 
that are introduced to capture the underlying dynamic in 
macroeconomics data. All of these have been developed 
or analyzed by Christiano et al. (2005) for the US and the 
Smets and Wouters (2003) for the European countries. 
This class of models is often called the New Neoclassical 
Synthesis (see Goodfriend & King 1997 ; Clarida et al. 
1998). However, the 2007-2009 US recession differs 
considerably from other postwar US recessions and from 
the parallel recessions in other high-income countries 
like Canada, France, Germany and the United Kingdom. 
Many scholars have blamed the failure of the DSGE model 
to predict the crisis. In fact, the crisis lasted up to 2009 due 
to the significant productivity declines and much smaller 
declines in labor input according to Ohanian (2010). 
In addition, his analysis indicated that the 2007-2009 
recession is not well understood within current classes of 
economic models, including both standard real business 
cycle models, and perhaps surprisingly including models 
in which financial distress reduces economic activity.
Most small economies including Malaysia have 
not depended on the DSGE model in predicting their 
economic performance. The global financial crisis in 
2007 was characterized by an episode of acute financial 
stress and a sharp global economic contraction. However, 
they are many debates that show that the use of DSGE 
models remains on the boundary of the policy decision-
making process in emerging market economies (Tovar 
2008). One possible explanation is that emerging market 
economies often experienced rapid structural changes. 
As a result, the estimated structural parameters in DSGE 
models are often not stable across the different policy 
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regimes. The complex nature of DSGE models may 
have also important concerns related to the degree of 
misspecification of current DSGE models. In such cases, 
we cannot rely on DSGE models because the stability of 
structural parameters is the fundamental assumption for 
the validity of DSGE models, as clearly noted by Lucas 
(1976). Nevertheless, Jiho’s (2012) study on Korean 
economy found a stability of structural parameters during 
the examined period, although, important policy changes 
took place during the financial crisis. Thus, this analysis 
will use an existing DSGE model as a benchmark model 
in predicting the economy in Malaysia. With application 
of models developed by Smets and Wouters (2003) and 
an extension model by Wickens (2011), this study will 
analyze putting a DSGE to a structural VAR analysis by 
setting restrictions suggested by Peersman and Straub 
(2005) and Wickens (2011). In order to prove whether 
restrictions in DSGE models are suitable to be used 
by policymakers in Malaysia, thus, by using lengthy 
quarterly economic data from 1998 to 2014 in Malaysia, 
we want to estimate for the restrictions suggested by 
Peersman and Straub (2005). There will be two sub-
sample data sets (pre-crisis and post-crisis). The central 
bank of Malaysia has adopted an interest rate targeting 
regime as its monetary operational framework taking the 
overnight rate as the operating target after the financial 
crisis in 1997. Currently, a manage floating exchange rate 
is being implemented.
Our main contribution is in the literature of the 
macroeconomics by using SVAR based on the DSGE 
restrictions. This paper concentrates on estimating 
structural parameters of the output, consumption, 
investment, employment, price, the policy rate and rate of 
return on loans before and after 2007 financial crisis. The 
objective of the paper is to empirically analyze whether 
the 2007 financial crisis changes structural parameters 
by using structural VAR estimation. This analysis focuses 
on the time series of Malaysia macroeconomics variables 
from 1998Q1 to 2014Q3, by using structural VAR 
analysis. This paper extends in two important directions: 
i) it estimates the coefficient of contemporaneous 
effects and ii) it predicts the impulse response effects of 
innovation lags.
The plan of the paper is as follows: Section 2 contains 
the literature review, Section 3 the methodology and 
Section 4 reports the empirical results. Finally, Section 5 
concludes the overall findings of the paper. The appendix 
contains all figures.
LITERATURE REVIEW
There are many approaches that have been formulated 
for analysing and explaining the 2007 financial crisis. 
Some have blamed the baseline DSGE model that had 
been used to predict economic activity in the US. 
However, they have missed the blaming point where the 
model does not include banking and financial sectors 
in the model as another important factor influencing 
economic performance. Due to the financial crisis, they 
are a few models that have been formulated to find ways 
to determine the causes of the financial crisis. Wickens 
(2011) contributed to the literature by developing a DSGE 
model of banks and financial intermediation with default 
risk. He mentioned that the financial crisis of 2007 failed 
to correctly assess and priced the risk of default. In order 
to analyze default risk in the macroeconomy, a simple 
general equilibrium model with banks and financial 
intermediation was constructed in which default risk 
could be priced. In the model it was shown how the 
credit spread could be attributed largely to the risk of 
default and how excess loan creation may emerge due 
to different attitudes to risk by borrowers and lenders. 
His model can also be used to analyse systemic risk due 
to macroeconomic shocks which may be reduced by 
holding collateral. 
Said (2015) has developed a macroeconomy model 
by including default shocks in the model that led to 
bank runs which had not been included in Wickens 
(2011) model. We will extend a model for the banking 
sector developed by Said (2013) in banking sector and 
show how the credit spread created from the difference 
between the loan rate and deposit rate can be found in 
the model. 
An earlier study that focused on bank runs using the 
portfolio theory of banking was developed by Diamond 
and Dybvig (1983). As a response to dramatic signs of 
banking crisis is bank runs as depositors withdrew their 
funds rather than risk losing them if the bank’s collapse. 
Therefore, Diamond and Dybvig (1983) had proposed 
deposit insurance provided by the government and funded 
through an optimal tax on all consumers that created no 
distortions. In reference to bank runs, Allens, Carletti and 
Gale (2008) had also shown how open-market operations 
conducted by the central bank through the interbank 
market, and funded by a tax imposed by the government, 
could remove the risk of bank runs and enabled the 
economy to achieve its optimal solution. Curdia and 
Woodford (2010) had included exogenous bad loans in 
their model and they assumed that the risks of bad loans 
were not priced. Our model will assume that endogenous 
bad loans and the risk effect will be priced.
Bank lending is also exposed to output shocks. This 
is because demand for loans is pro-cyclical. In an earlier 
study, King (1986) found that although there was no 
clear relationship between loans and output, there was 
a rather closer one with output and demand deposits in 
U.S. banks. However, banks’ lending supplies could 
behave differently according to the business cycle. Boot 
(2000) and Thakor (2004) discussed how banks deeply 
involved in relationship lending are likely to undergo 
smooth lending ‘through the cycle’. Nevertheless, 
Gambacorta and Mistrulli (2004) found that there was 
a positive correlation between credit and output. An 
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increased in output caused loans to increase. In addition, 
the interaction between output and excess capital was 
negative; implying the credit supply of well-capitalized 
banks was less dependent on the business cycle. 
Thus, we conclude that the output shocks as in Said’s 
model (2015) can have a pro-cyclical effect on banks’ 
optimal decision.
An alternative explanation of liquidity shortage can 
be seen in the study of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). This 
is due to the existence of credit constraint. The problem 
of adverse selection implies that, faced with imperfect 
information about which borrowers are likely to default, 
even in equilibrium, lenders may not only ration credit, 
they may also charge them different loan rates. Charging 
different loan rates may itself affect the behavior of 
particular borrowers, which can lead to a moral hazard. 
Those who are will to borrow at a high interest rate may, 
on average, be more willing to default and hence take 
the greatest risks.
METHODOLOGY
In the following sections we present a New Keynesian 
DSGE model as described by Smets and Wouters (2003), 
Wicken (2011) and Said (2015). Those papers have 
demonstrated that the medium scale DSGE models are 
able to fit data as well as conventional theoretical VARs. 
Several structural shocks can be introduced and estimated 
within the model framework. These features make them 
sufficiently rich to capture the stochastics and dynamics 
in the data and act as valuable tools for policy analysis 
in an empirically plausible set-up. 
SUMMARY OF THE MODEL
Smets and Wouters (2003) developed and estimated a 
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model 
with sticky prices and wages for the euro area. Their 
model incorporated various other features such as habit 
formation, costs of adjustment in capital accumulation 
and variable capacity utilization. They used seven key 
macroeconomics variables such as GDP, consumption, 
investment, prices, real wages, employment, and the 
nominal interest rate. They also introduced ten orthogonal 
structural shocks including productivity, labor supply, 
investment, preference, cost-push, and monetary policy 
shocks that allow for an empirical investigation of the 
effects of such shocks and of their contribution to business 
cycle fluctuations in the euro area. 
A key feature of the recent financial crisis was 
default within both the non-bank private sector and the 
banking sector that was generated endogenously into 
the DSGE macroeconomics framework. Wickens (2011) 
has suggested a banking sector as another important 
sector in a DSGE model, instead of a non-bank private 
sector and a consolidated government-central bank. 
He starts with a simple model by assuming that banks 
receive interest from loans to households and do not 
pay interest on deposits. Banks also hold reserves at 
the central bank and can borrow either from non-bank 
sector or, if this is constrained by a liquidity shortage, 
from the central bank.
Said (2013) proved that the banking sector in 
Malaysia is operating in a monopolistic competition, 
therefore, the price of loans will depend on the demand 
of loans. The banking sector will set their loan rates based 
on the difference of demand and supply of loans.
ESTIMATION METHODOLOGY AND DATA
In this section we first discuss how we estimate the 
structural parameters and the process governing the 
structural shocks. Our estimation will only include seven 
endogenous variables Yt, Ct, It, Et, nt, Rt,, RLt – Rt and 
structural shocks as suggested by Smets and Wouters 
(2003) and Wickens (2011) and restrictions suggested 
by Peersman and Straub (2005).
ESTIMATION METHODOLOGY
This paper analyzes macroeconomics effects of aggregate 
demand, aggregate supply (output and employment), 
price, and monetary and financial shocks in Malaysia 
using a structural VAR (SVAR) approach. This paper 
contributes to the literature on financial, monetary and 
technology shocks as suggested by Smets and Wouters 
(2003), Wickens (2012) and Said (2015). SVAR models 
originate from monetary policy analysis where it has 
been used extensively to study the transmission of real 
and monetary shocks. Structural VAR models impose 
identifying restrictions on an odinary VAR model to infer 
structural shocks from it. Assume that an unrestricted 
VAR model,
xt = A(L)et  (1)
is estimated. Where x is a vector of covariance stationary 
macroeconomics variables, A(L) a polynomial matrix of 
lag length l, L the lag operator and e a vector of reduced-
form innovations in the elements of x with variance-
covariance matrix E(eteTt) = Σ. These reduced-form 
innovations are likely to be correlated and can, therefore, 
not necessarily be interpreted as purely structural 
innovations. To remedy this, the SVAR approach relates 
the vector x to a vector of structural innovations, μt.
xt = B(L)ut  (2)
where B(L) is a polynomial matrix in L. In this SVAR 
ut is a vector of serially and contemporaneously 
uncorrelated, normalized structural residuals with 
E(utuTt ) = I. From equation (1) and (2) it follows that the 
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vector of reduced-form innovations can be represented 
as a linear combination of the structural residuals, i.e., 
et = Cut with CCT = Σ. As a result, xt = A(L)Cut = C(L)
ut and A(L)C = B(L), enabling the identification of the 
structural innovations from the reduced-form innovation 
of the reduced-form VAR. C(L) is a lag polynomial where 
Cs are coefficient matrices at the respective lags of the 
errors. The structure for equation (2) can be obtained 
from the estimates of the reduced-form representation 
in equation (1), provided that the transformation matrix 
C is of full rank.
The structural VAR model in equation (2) imposes 
identifying restrictions upon VAR estimate in equation 
(1) to recover structural innovations from the estimated 
VAR. Identification is achieved in practice by imposing 
identifying short or long-run restrictions. In our analysis 
we will include the short and long-run restrictions in 
order to identify the contemporaneous the structural 
parameters. In order to exactly identify a VAR model 
of seven endogenous variables, restrictions need to 
be imposed in the structural model in equation (2). 
Following Sims (1980), the Cholesky decomposition is 
one method of identifying impulse-response functions 
in a VAR, this method corresponds to an SVAR. There 
are several sets of constraints A and B that are easily 
manipulated by the Cholesky decomposition. In order 
to impose the Cholesky restrictions it is assumed that an 
SVAR model takes the form of 
A~(IK – A1 – A2L2 – ApLp)yt = B
~et (3)
where A~ is a lower triangular matrix with ones on the 
diagonal and B~ is a diagonal matrix. The P matrix for 
this model is Psr = A–1B
–, its estimate, Psrˆ is obtained by 
plugging in estimates of A– and B–, and should be equal to 
the Cholesky decomposition of Σˆ .
To illustrate with our analysis, we use Malaysian 
macroeconomics data and analyze a log-linearized model 
suggested by Smets and Wouters (2003), Wickens (2011) 
and Said (2015). However, we limit our endogenous 
variables to seven variables and only include six shocks 
which are aggregate demand, investment, aggregate 
supply, output, and monetary and financial shocks. 
We have reduced the amount of restrictions that are 
suggested by Smets and Wouters (2003) since some of the 
restrictions that come out of the DSGE model are at odds 
with alternative theoretical models or with the existing 
empirical evidence. In addition, we also include some 
restrictions suggested by Wickens (2011). All restrictions 
in the work of Peersman and Straub (2005) that have 
been used for our empirical estimations are presented in 
the matrices equation below. All our macroeconomics 
variables are in log-difference, except for policy rate, R 
and rate of return on loans, RLt – Rt in rates variables. We 
will impose an overidentified model, which is consistent 
with the theory or model suggested by Smets and Wouters 
(2003), Wickens (2011) and Said (2015). Our A and B 
matrices for seven endogenous variables of output, Yt, 
consumption, Ct, investment, It, employment, Et, price 
level, πt, policy rate, Rt, and rate of return on loans, 
RLt – Rt are as follows:
A=
1 0 0 0 0 0 0
a21 1 0 0 0 0 0
a31 a32 1 0 0 0 0
0 a42 a43 1 0 0 0
a51 a52 a53 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 a65 1 0
0 a72 a73 0 0 a76 1
⎡
⎣
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥
and
  (4)B=
b11 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 b22 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 b33 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 b44 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 b55 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 b66 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 b77
⎡
⎣
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥
In the short run, with these structural restrictions, we 
assume that the first row of equations suggests output, Yt 
responds to other variables in the system with a lag. In row 
two, the consumption is assumed to respond with a lag to 
innovations in real, monetary and financial variables. The 
third row can be viewed as a response of investment, It. 
It shows that investment is contemporaneously affected 
by output, and consumption, Ct, whereas the rest is 
assumed to affect investment with a lag. The fourth row 
of equations suggests that consumptions, and investment 
contemporaneously affected employment level, Et. 
The price level, πt is shown in the fifth row which is 
contemporaneously affected by output, consumption, and 
investment.1 The monetary variable such as policy rate 
was set to stabilize the price level with a lag innovation. 
The sixth row is the response of policy rate to the 
change in price level. Central bank of Malaysia has to 
contemporaneously change the policy rate to the change 
in the price level to stabilize the price level. The final 
row is a response of rate of return on loans with a lag to 
innovations in output, employment and price variables. 
But, it is contemporaneously affected by the policy rate. 
Since the banking sector in Malaysia is characterized 
as monopolistic competitions as is suggested by Said 
2013, thus, the rate of return on loans depends directly 
on demand of loans by the non-bank private sector, and 
therefore, the shocks in aggregate demand (consumption, 
and investment) contemporaneously affected the rate of 
return on loans.
For estimating a stability of the models tested, 
eigenvalues of the companion matrix of the VAR model 
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are calculated. The stability of the models estimated 
can be seen in the work of Lutkepohl (1993) that shows 
that if all the eigenvalues are inside the unit circle, the 
model is stable.
DATA
The model presented in the previous section is estimated 
with structural VAR estimation techniques using seven 
key macroeconomics of quarterly Malaysian time 
series as observable variables: the log difference of 
real GDP, real consumption, real investment, real 
employment, price level, the policy rate and rate of 
return on loans. All data have been adjusted using the 
consumer price index (CPI) of Malaysia in 2005. The 
range of data is between 1998Q1 and 2014Q3 which 
is from the International Financial Statistics. The data 
will be estimated into three samples of data; first, pre 
2007 financial crisis; second, post 2007 financial crisis; 
and third, full sample of data. The idea of dividing the 
estimation into sub-samples is for determining the 
stability of structural parameters before and after the 
2007 financial crisis. 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
In this section, we focus on the responses of 
macroeconomics variables to the aggregate supply, 
aggregate demand, price, and monetary and financial 
shocks (as suggested by Smets & Wouters 2003; 
Wickens 2011; Said 2015) using the SVAR model. Prior 
to estimation, we also estimated the diagnostic test for 
determining the optimum lag length of the models. The 
optimum lag for log-difference of pre-crisis, post-crisis 
and all data sample models is six and is found by using 
AIC, SBIC and HQIC.2 
SVAR RESULTS
We imposed restrictions as specified in matrices equation 
(4) to identify the structural shocks. The structural 
parameter estimates of A and B are given in Table 1. 
Table 1 shows the results for SVAR estimations for 
log-difference data. The likelihood ratio tests statistics 
with p-value of 0.17 for over-identification with X 2 = 
5.02 for the pre-crisis data sample. For the post-crisis data 
sample the likelihood ratio tests statistics with p-value 
of 0.161) for over-identification with X 2 = 5.52. Finally 
 TABLE 1. Structural VAR estimates
Matrix A
Pre-Crisis
1 0 0 0 0 0 0
–0.9171204* 1 0 0 0 0 0
–0.3047535 –0.4284036** 1 0 0 0 0
0 –0.2767598* –0.3696781* 1 0 0 0
–0.091871* –0.0362677* 0.0529879* 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 17.11586** 1 0
0 12.31627 –2.299352 0 0 0.0595719 1
⎡
⎣
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥
Post--Crisis
1 0 0 0 0 0 0
–0.2591462* 1 0 0 0 0 0
–1.006251* –0.6583194 1 0 0 0 0
0 –16.17219* 0.2891319 1 0 0 0
–0.2985523* 1.178297* 0.171478* 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 26.79407* 1 0
0 1.491521 –0.9236306*** 0 0 0.1290253** 1
⎡
⎣
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥
All Sample Data
1 0 0 0 0 0 0
–0.3965794* 1 0 0 0 0 0
–1.216018* 0.0733939 1 0 0 0 0
0 1.753462* –1.382852* 1 0 0 0
0.09735 0.2469793* 0.0619494 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 5.490371** 1 0
0 0.1916124 –2.273417* 0 0 0.2551831* 1
⎡
⎣
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥
202 Jurnal Ekonomi Malaysia 50(2)
for all sample data the likelihood ratio tests statistics 
with p-value of 0.153 for over-identification with X 2 = 
5.63. All of the samples are shown to be not significant. 
The test for overidentifying restrictions cannot reject 
the H-null or the validity of the constraints imposed on 
the long-run responses, because the value of statistics 
will be too small. Take note that, because the estimated 
coefficients of matrix A are expressed on the same side 
of matrix B in equation (3), the negative (positive) sign 
should be read as being positive (negative). 
In the second row it shows the results for 
contemporaneous effects on consumption. It shows 
that output has contemporaneous positive effects on 
consumption in pre-crisis and full sample data. For 
pre-crisis, post-crisis, and full sample data it is shown 
that the increase in output will increase consumption 
immediately with 0.9171204, 0.2591462 and 0.3965794 
coefficient values, respectively. It shows that, the effect 
of increasing in output on consumption has decreased 
to 0.1291462 after the crisis from 0.9171204 before the 
crisis. This has shown that after the crisis it has limited 
the ability of consumers’ demand, as consumers reduced 
their structure of consumption to saving.
In the third row it shows the contemporaneous 
effects on investment. It shows that output has 
positive contemporaneous effects on investment for 
post-crisis and full sample cases with 1.006251 and 
1.216018 coefficient values, respectively. But, it is 
not significant for the pre-crisis case except the effect 
of consumption on investment is significant with a 
positive 0.4284036 coefficient value. The fourth row 
shows the contemporaneous effects on employment. 
It is shown that consumption and investment have 
negative and positive effects on employment, with 
coefficients –1.753462 and 1.382852, respectively 
for full sample data. However, for the pre-crisis 
sub-sample, consumption and investment positively 
contemporaneously affected employment at 0.2767598 
and 0.3696781 coefficient values, respectively. This has 
shown that the increase in aggregate demand has also 
increased the employment as it created a lot more excess 
of demand and pushed firms to offer more employment 
to produce more goods and services in the economy. 
In addition, the fifth row shows the contemporaneous 
effects on price level by output, consumption and 
investment in the pre-crisis and post-crisis sub-samples. 
However, the sign for consumption changed from positive 
to negative after the crisis. This shows that the structural 
parameters are not stable after an economic crisis. The 
contemporaneous effects on policy rate can be shown in 
Matrix B
Pre-Crisis
2.19e-15* 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 6.10e-16* 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 8.37e-16* 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 3.04e-16* 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 2.18e-17* 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 9.36e-15* 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1.08e-14*
⎡
⎣
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥
Post-Crisis
1.23e-16* 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1.50e-17* 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 7.80e-17* 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 2.37e-16* 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1.77e-17* 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 6.24e-16* 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 2.35e-16*
⎡
⎣
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥
All Sample Data
0.0066025* 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0.0053897* 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0.0089707* 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0.0232717* 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0.0030273* 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0.086403* 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0539242*
⎡
⎣
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥
TABLE 1. continued
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the sixth row. It is shown that price level has negative 
contemporaneous effects on policy rate with coefficient 
values3 –17.11586, –26.79407 and –5.490371 for pre-
crisis, post-crisis and full sample cases, respectively. In 
other words, as price grows by one unit, policy rate goes 
down by 0.171158, 0.26794 and 0.054903 for pre-crisis, 
post-crisis and full sample cases, respectively. This has 
shown that the shocks in price level will immediately 
change the policy rate to ensure the stability of the price 
level for all cases. The coefficient value after the crisis 
has increased tremendously to –26.79407. This has shown 
that the policy has to be adjusted to stable the price level. 
The final row shows the contemporaneous effects on rate 
of return on loans. The results show that investment and 
policy rates have contemporaneous effects on the rate of 
return on loans for post-crisis and full sample cases. The 
change in policy rate has a significant negative effect on 
rate of return on loans with –0.1290253 and –0.2551831 
coefficient values for post-crisis and full sample cases, 
respectively, but is not significant for pre-crisis sub-
sample data. The results show that the investment has a 
positive effect of rate of return on loans with 0.9236306 
and 2.273417 coefficient values for both post-crisis and 
full sample cases, respectively.
IMPULSE RESPONSE
Impulse response functions with a 95% confidence 
interval for the six structural shocks, output, aggregate 
demand, aggregate supply, price, and monetary and 
financial shocks, are reported in figures 1-3.4 Each 
structural shock is of one standard deviation of their size.
OUPUT SHOCK
Figures 1a), 2a) and 3a) are the effects of an output 
shock. The effect of an output leads to an increase in the 
change rate of return on loans in the pre-crisis sample 
of the data. However, the change rate of return on loans 
fluctuates for the post-crisis and full sample data and it’s 
shown that after a quarter four there was a sudden jump 
in the change rate of return on loans after a decrease in 
the change of policy rate. The effect of output on the 
policy rate shows a decrease changes in pre-crisis and 
full sample data. The levels of employment are shown 
to fluctuate in the post-crisis case. It can be shown that 
the 2007 economic crisis has given an unstable effect on 
the employment level. After a quarter one the changes 
of employment level has increased and fluctuated after 
the next quarters. This has shown that economic crisis 
has given a puzzle changes on the employment level. 
Nevertheless, there are no clear changes in the level of 
price and consumption in the three sub-samples. But, the 
result of output on the change of investment shows a little 
effect in post-crisis sample. 
AGGREGATE DEMAND SHOCK
Figures 1b), 2b) and 3b) are the effects of an aggregate 
demand shock. The effects of an aggregate demand shock 
have a positive effect on the rate of return on loans in 
the pre-crisis case; however, it shows a sharp drop after 
a crisis and fluctuates thereafter. The effect of aggregate 
demand on the policy rate fluctuates after the crisis and for 
the full sample data. However, it shows a little decrease 
in the pre-crisis case. An unexpected change in aggregate 
demand has not shown a puzzle effect on employment for 
the pre-crisis sample. However, the effects are unstable 
for the post-crisis and full sample data. The price, output 
and investment responses to the aggregate demand shock 
are not puzzled since there is no visible effect on all of 
the components.
INVESTMENT SHOCK
Figures 1c), 2c), and 3c) are the effects of an investment 
shock. The effect of an investment leads to an increase in 
the rate of return on loans in the pre-crisis sample of data. 
However, the rate of return on loans fluctuates for the 
post-crisis and full sample data. The effect of investment 
on the policy rate shows an increasing trend from quarter 
two to quarter seven; however it has decreased thereafter 
in the pre-crisis and full sample data. The level of 
employment is shown to have fluctuated in the post-crisis 
sample. This shows that the 2007 economic crisis has 
given an unstable effect on the employment level. The 
mixed results in both pre and post-crisis sub-samples 
have shown that the structural parameters are not stable 
after the 2007 financial crisis.
AGGREGATE SUPPLY SHOCK
Figures 1d), 2d) and 3d) are the effects of an aggregate 
supply shock. The rate of return on loans response has a 
positive effect on the aggregate supply for the pre-crisis 
case. However, the rate of return on loans has shown a 
sharp drop after the crisis and fluctuated thereafter. This 
has shown that after the financial crisis the rate of return 
on loans fluctuated in order to adjust to the shock in the 
aggregate supply. The effect of an aggregate supply shock 
has a positive effect on the policy rate for the pre-crisis 
sample. However, after 2007 economic crisis the effect 
is more unstable. The responses of consumption, price 
output, and investment have not shown puzzling effects 
of an aggregate supply.
PRICE SHOCK
Figures 1e), 2e), and 3e) are the effects of a price shock. 
Unexpected change in the price level has a negative effect 
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on the rate of return on loans in the pre-crisis sample. 
Nevertheless, the effect is shown to be unstable after the 
crisis as the response fluctuates. In addition, unexpected 
change in the price level has a negative effect on the 
policy rate in the pre-crisis, but, has a puzzle effect after 
the post-crisis sample. The responses of employment, 
consumption, output and investment have not shown 
puzzles effects on the price shock in the pre-crisis sample. 
However, it does have a puzzle effect on employment 
after the crisis.
MONETARY POLICY SHOCK
Figures (1f), (2f) and (3f) are the effects of a monetary 
shock. An unexpected change in the monetary policy 
rate has a negative effect on the rate of return on loans 
for the pre-crisis sub-sample. Nevertheless, the effects 
fluctuated after the sub-sample crisis. The change in 
the policy rate has no clear effect on employment level 
before the crisis. Nevertheless, the effect on employment 
is more puzzles after the 2007 financial crisis. 
CONCLUSION
We estimate a New Keynesian SVAR model of the 
Malaysian economy covering the period 1998 to 
2014. The aggregate relationships imposed on the 
contemporaneous structure of the SVAR model are 
derived from a close economy New Keynesian model as 
suggested by Smets and Wouters (2003), and Wickens 
(2011). The New Keynesian SVAR model is estimated 
by the maximum likelihood that accounts for the full 
interactions between consumers, firms, the central bank, 
and the banking sector. We then estimated dynamic 
responses of the macroeconomic variables to monetary 
policy, price, aggregate demand, aggregate supply, and 
financial, and investment shocks. 
Our parameters estimates are significant and 
correctly signed. The results have concluded that the 
structural parameters are not stable after the 2007 
financial crisis, for employment, rate of return on loans 
and policy rate. However, the effects are not affected 
by the real variables such as output, investment, 
consumption and price level. In addition, unexpected 
change of demand in the non-bank private sector has 
puzzled the rate of return on loans after the economic 
crisis compared prior to the crisis. The monetary policy 
shocks have given fluctuation effects on the rate of 
return on loans and employment after the economic 
crisis. However, the effects on real macroeconomics 
variables are more stable. The unstable effect on the 
employment level has shown that policy makers should 
have taken a necessary action to solve this fluctuation 
in the employment level. 
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ENDNOTES
1 Since the range of data is quarterly, therefore the 
assumption of sticky price is affected in medium to long 
run is relevant to be affected contemporaneously by these 
variables.
2 The results for diagnostic tests can be provided upon 
request to the author.
3 Data for price level is logged difference and policy rate 
is not logged, so coefficient needs to be interpreted by 
dividing coefficients values with 100.
4 The computation of the confidence intervals is based on 
the bootstrapping procedure.
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APPENDIX 
Impulse Response functions of basic structural VAR model 
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FIGURE 1b. The effect of demand shock
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FIGURE 1a. The effect of an output shock
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FIGURE 1c. The effect of an investment shock
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FIGURE 1d. The effect of supply shock
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FIGURE 1e. The effect of a price shock
FIGURE 1f. The effect of a monetary shock
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FIGURE 2a. The effect of an output shock
FIGURE 2b. The effect of a demand shock
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FIGURE 2d. The effect of a supply shock
FIGURE 2c. The effect of an investment shock
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FIGURE 2f. The effect of a monetary shock
FIGURE 2e. The effect of a price shock
212 Jurnal Ekonomi Malaysia 50(2)
Rate of return on loans Policy rate Employment
Price Output Investment
.05
0
–.05
.05
0
–.05
0 2 4 6 8 0 2 4 6 8 0 2 4 6 8
Rate of return on loans Policy rate Employment
Price Consumption Investment
.1
.05
–.05
–.1
.1
.05
–.05
–.1
0 2 4 6 8 0 2 4 6 8 0 2 4 6 8
0
0
All sample
FIGURE 3b. The effect of a demand shock
FIGURE 3a.The effect of an output shock
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FIGURE 3d. The effect of a supply shock
FIGURE 3c. The effect of an investment shock
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FIGURE 3e. The effect of a price shock
FIGURE 3f. The effect of a monetary shock
